Canadian Swine Health Intelligence Network

Réseau canadien de surveillance de la santé porcine

CSHIN QUARTERLY PRODUCER REPORT

REPORT Q2 APR-JUN 2025

HIGHLIGHTS FOR SWINE PRODUCERS

Senecavirus A (SVA) Update

Starting in 2015, Senecavirus A (SVA) has caused intermittent complications with respect to the export of Canadian cull animals to the United States. This disease resembles reportable swine vesicular diseases. This is a national issue and since June 2025 has impacted Ontario cull sow movements.

In July 2025, the APHIS and the USDA removed the export eligibility status for a cull sow assembly in Ontario due to SVA lesions being seen in cull sows sent to a USDA processing facility. These lesions initiated foreign animal disease investigations at this US processing plant. The suspect animal(s) were initially quarantined for individual inspection and further testing. Since the initial site, another 2 Ontario cull sow assembly sites have also had their export eligibility status revoked by APHIS and the USDA for similar reasons. The affected assembly sites accept cull sows from Quebec, the Maritimes and Ontario. Each affected assembly site must action the USDA requirements including emptying each assembly site so that it can be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected before each affected site could regain their export status. The assembly site operators are working closely with veterinarians to develop the required SOP's, and to begin actioning the USDA listed requirements. This export disruption will have the potential to create significant effects on the eastern Canadian cull sow system. While the process is started, it is expected to take an undetermined amount of time to action all of the USDA requirements. Similar export issues, related to SVA, have arisen previously in western Canada. It is important to continue inter-provincial industry collaboration on this issue.

Producers and veterinarians involved in export inspections, need to be diligent in checking all animals for SVA type lesions including blisters, ulcers on the snout, ears, face, on the coronary band or between the claws on the feet before shipping them for slaughter, cull markets and or directly for export to the USA.

Photo source: Swine Health Ontario

Canadian Animal Health Surveillance System (CAHSS) Q2 Update: H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in U.S. Dairy Cattle- Update for Swine Producers

Dr. Murray Gillies from the Canadian Animal Health Surveillance System (CAHSS), a division under Animal Health Canada (AHC), provided an update on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) detections in dairy cattle in the U.S.A. Detections seem to have slowed with only 1 new detection being reported from the state of California in the last 30 days. The USDA's National Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL) confirmed that 43 repeat cases of HPAI have been confirmed at previously cleared dairies. The repeat infections of HPAI resulted in these premises being re-quarantined. Quarantines are lifted after these herds have 3 negative HPAI test results from bulk tank milk at least 1 week apart.

As of August 15, 2025, 45 U.S. states are enrolled in and performing active surveillance for HPAI. Out of these, 26 remain unaffected by HPAI. The majority of unaffected states are northeastern states and happen to also be the main states that import dairy cattle into Canada. Wisconsin remains listed as provisionally unaffected and is a high-density dairy state. Both Wisconsin and Minnesota plan to conduct bulk milk sample surveillance testing moving forward.



Major swine production states have also declared detections in dairy e.g., Iowa. Influenza A is already considered endemic in swine. The SHIC report quoted a published paper from the Frontiers in Veterinary Science (Aug 13, 2025) link **here** stated: **"Considering the cumulative findings from both experimental and field studies, natural infection with HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b genotypes B3.13 and D1.1 appears to be a very likely event. Once introduced into the swine population, these viruses may act as dead-end infections or exhibit limited transmission among pigs".**
In some species, HPAI infections have presented without respiratory clinical signs and only with neurological signs, so it was recommended that swine with neurological signs should also be tested for HPAI and Influenza A viruses. Influenza A surveillance is often voluntary. A more targeted Influenza A surveillance approach is needed that will include testing for HPAI. For swine barns that have air filtration in place, monitoring the filters periodically, especially filters that are located near infected poultry barns, could serve as effective surveillance samples.
Take Home Messages: There have been no reported cases of HPAI H5N1 in dairy cattle, beef cattle or swine in Canada to date. Canadian herds with compatible clinical signs are being tested and all results have yielded negative results. Every effort must be made to keep HPAI H5N1 out of swine. The CSHIN network would like to remind all swine veterinarians and producers to continue with enhanced biosecurity measures including the following:

- **Avoid allowing swine to drink untreated surface water**
- **Ensure bird-proofing in barns or swine housing areas**

- **Restrict scavenger mammals and control deadstock bins with ensuring multiple and timely pick-ups**
- **Don't' feed untreated milk or milk by-products to swine. Must ensure it has been pasteurized first.**
- **Evaluate biosecurity risks poised from dairy operations e.g. shared workers, geographically close locations, shared equipment etc.**

Those that work directly with swine should be encouraged to stay home whenever possible if sick or experiencing clinical symptoms of Influenza. People working with sick pigs need to ensure they follow good biosecurity practices and whenever possible wear an N95 or equivalent mask and wash their hands frequently. Any personnel that work with swine should be encouraged to get the "flu" shot for influenza yearly.

Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea (PED) and Porcine Deltacoronavirus (PDCoV)

OAHN (Ontario)

Jessica Fox from Swine Health Ontario (SHO) provided an update at the OAHN swine network meeting on PED and PDCoV cases seen in Q2 of 2025. In Q2, there were 9 PDCoV cases and 12 PED cases. For the PDCoV cases, 3 were sow units and the 6 were nursery-finish, all of which were movement-related (not independent outbreaks). For the PED cases, there were 5 sow barn cases and 7 nursery-finish cases, 6 of which were movement-related. **Overall, the case load was decreased compared to Q1 2025 and Q4 2024, which is likely a result of the warmer weather combined with increased industry vigilance.**

SHO continues to remind those in the industry to stay mindful about biosecurity to help reduce PED and PDCoV cases. **SHO continues to support elimination as the best strategy for disease control. Veterinarians are encouraged to continue to be diligent in testing for coronaviruses in all gastrointestinal cases, as PDCoV can present with minimal clinical signs. Timely diagnosis of these cases can help limit widespread contamination and potential spread to other sites.**

Ontario swine veterinarians continue to be encouraged to promote the use of the Swine Health Area Regional Control (SHARC) program to producers so that they can stay aware of current positive sites in their proximity allowing them to make informed decisions about what transportation routes are best. Choosing a transportation route with less known outbreaks can decrease the risk of further transmission of disease. The PED and PDCoV tracking map is available on the Swine Health Ontario website and shows current and annual cases by county. http://www.swinehealthontario.ca/Disease-Information/PED-PDCoV-Tracking-Map

CWSHIN (Western Provinces)

Dr. Jette Christensen reported that in April 2025, the western provinces detected 2 new cases of PED in Manitoba. These two premises are linked through pig movements with one being a nursery and the other being a downstream finishing barn. No other swine farms are located within the two buffer areas. No other epidemiological links have been discovered between these farms. Both herds are working on virus elimination. The first herd has since regained presumptive negative status for PED.

CWSHIN continues to message to veterinarians and producers the importance of biosecurity practices in high-risk traffic sites. Environmental sampling at these sites continue to test positive and all should be assumed to be positive. High-risk traffic sites include rest stops, assembly yards, docks at processors etc. Often these high-risk traffic sites are noted to be impossible to thoroughly clean and disinfect. Manure spreading season is here and with this comes more risks for PED, PDCoV and other virus movements.

RAIZO (Quebec)

Dr. Roxann Hart reported that Quebec had no new cases of PED or PDCoV detected in Q2. In Q1, Quebec reported 1 case of PED and PDCoV combined and 5 cases of PDCoV. From these cases reported in the Q1 report, one has since regained negative status, and the rest are working on obtaining a negative status. Quebec continues to conduct PED and PDCoV environmental surveillance sampling at processing docks. Positive tests continue to be reported.

Take Home Messages: Ontario saw a decrease in PED and PDCoV detections in Q2 compared to the previous two quarters, but challenges with PED and PDCoV continue to be high. Enhanced biosecurity measures need to be taken when visiting high-risk sites like assembly yards, animal resting locations and processing docks. All high-risk sites should be assumed to be positive for various infectious agents such as PED/PDCoV, PRRS, Influenza etc. Care must be taken to avoid contamination of livestock trailers, footwear and clothing when visiting these high-risk sites.

CanSpotASF Surveillance Q2 Update

Below is the quarterly report on the CanSpotASF surveillance project with the main objectives to enhance early detection and therefore limit its spread if ASF is ever detected in Canada. CanSpotASF surveillance has also been helpful in proving freedom from ASF in international trade negotiations with other countries.

CanSpotASF 2025 Quarter 2 Report (Apr 1 to Jun 30)

Surveillance component (Tool)	Definition of a case	Region	Cases tested for ASF Quarterly (2025 Q2)
Rule-out testing: herds, laboratories	Case ID assigned by laboratory based on date of submission and premises	Maritimes	2
		Quebec	32
		Ontario	18
		Western Provinces*	14
Rule-out testing: Invasive wild pigs	Carcass	Maritimes	0
		Quebec	0
		Ontario	0
		Western Provinces*	40
Rule-out testing: federal abattoirs	Carcass	Maritimes (no federal abattoirs for swine)	
		Quebec	55
		Ontario	40
		Western Provinces*	114

Rule-out testing: provincial abattoirs		**Maritimes**	**0**
		Quebec	**9**
		Ontario	**3**
		Western Provinces*	**4**

*Western Provinces: Includes Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia

Disclaimers: The methodology used to calculate these numbers may differ amongst the reporting networks. CanSpotASF is a voluntary program. CanSpotASF testing is not indicative of invasive wild pig numbers in regions/provinces where this data was captured. It is important to note that all testing conducted to date has yielded negative ASF results.

New World Screwworm (NWSW) in North and Central America- Information for swine producers

CWSHIN (Western provinces)

Dr. Murray Gilles and Dr. Andrea Osborn provided an overview to the CSHIN Q2 team on New World Screwworm (NWSW) infections.

- New World Screwworm (NWSW) is a parasitic fly larva, *Cochliomyia hominivorax,* that causes wound myiasis. It is endemic in South America. This disease can affect most mammals including livestock, wildlife and humans.
- This disease was eradicated from the U.S. and Central America between 1957-2001 using sterile male flies. Re-emergence in the Florida Keys was noted in 2016, but that has since been controlled. Normally, Panama is the control point where millions of sterile flies are released to control northward movement.
- Re-emergence with steady northward movement has been ongoing since the summer of 2023. Cases can be referenced via this link.
- Human cases have been reported in Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize and Mexico. Travel associated cases have occurred in Canada and the U.S.
- The movement of NWSW northward may be due to a more aggressive fly, increased rainfall, sterile fly program mismanagement, illegal cattle trafficking, rearing cattle in "barrier" areas in Panama.
- Any impacts this outbreak is having on wildlife are unclear; it is difficult to know the extent of the cases.
- Mexico notified the U.S. of a detection of New World Screwworm in southern Mexico in a cow in November 2024. Immediate trade restrictions were issued by the USDA.
- New World Screwworm has been found as far north as the Yucatan peninsula, Oaxaca and Veracruz (360 miles from the U.S. border). Sterile fly releases moved from Panama to Mexico to try and prevent further northward movement, but flies surpassed that location, so this strategy hasn't been working. On May 11, 2025, the USDA closed the border to imports of animals from Mexico.
- The U.S. has put $750 M into efforts to prevent NWSW infections so far. They have made a huge investment into a new sterile fly facility located in Texas to combat this disease.
- **Massive economic impacts will occur in the U.S. if they are unable to prevent the introduction of the New World Screwworm. If this parasite was to arrive in Canada, if would not be able to survive our winters.**





Photo (left): Indicates the most favorable areas for NWSW to spread in the southern U.S. Photo (right): Indicates NWSW spread north within Mexico (updated Aug 23, 2025) via this link.

New CSHIN Website

We are proud to announce the launch of the new CSHIN website that can be accessed via this link. Moving forward all CSHIN reports will be posted via this website as well as other CSHIN related information including CanSpotASF quarterly reporting information. The website can be viewed in both English and French. CSHIN would like to thank Animal Health Canada- CAHSS division for their gracious financial and resource support to make this website a reality!

This information is a professional communication for swine producers. This information is not validated and may not reflect the entire clinical situation. Your judgment is required in the interpretation and use of it. It is the intent of CSHIN to improve the health of the national swine herd. CSHIN is funded by the Canadian Association of Swine Veterinarians (CASV), The Canadian Pork Council (CPC) and The Canadian Animal Health Surveillance System (CAHSS).

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